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I Introduction
Let us imagine that in 2000 the UN Secretary-
General is to bestow on five poor countries the
'National Poverty Commitment Award' for sus-
tained efforts to alleviate poverty Is Bangladesh
likely to be on the list? Its reputation is against it.
But let us for a minute forget reputation and list
some facts about Bangladesh that indicate why it
might be a serious competitor:
Like the East Asian countries that over several
decades were successful in combining eco-
nomic growth with enhanced income equality
(Japan, Korea, Taiwan), Bangladesh is now eth-
nically relatively homogenous and has a rela-
tively equal distribution of income.2 It was not
always ethnically homogenous, but the strug-
gle for independence from Pakistan and post-
independence politics have moved the country
strongly in that direction. The larger non-
Bengali Muslim population minorities - the
Biharis and the tribals - have been driven to
the margins of the society and the polity
Unlike in the past, large-scale business is now
dominated by Bengali Muslims. There is some
basis for Bangladeshis to think as Japanese and
Koreans are said to think: 'We are all in this
together. I can trust the government because it
represents people like me. If I make sacrifices
for the good of the nation, then some of the
benefits are likely to accrue to people like me.'
Recent history and the enduring facts of geog-
raphy have imposed on rich and poor alike the
kind of shared suffering that creates a sense of
national identity and provides the basis for vig-
orous anti-poverty measures on grounds of
national solidarity There have been two suc-
cessful independence struggles over the last 60
years. The second, in 1970-71, was bloody
and relatively protracted. Bangladeshis live
We are especially grateful to Stephen Devereux for
comments on an earlier draft of this paper and to
Nandini Gooptu for discussions of our initial findings.
z According to the most recent figures, the richest 10%
of the population of Bangladesh accounts for 24% of
national income (or consumption). This figure is typical
for South Asia - India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka each
register 25% - but much lower than Brazil (48%) and
South Africa (47%) (World Development Indicators
1998, Table 2.8).
under the continuous threat of floods and hur-
ricanes. While the poor undoubtedly suffer
more, the rich cannot escape entirely
Bangladesh's external political relations do not
compromise any commitment to anti-poverty
goals. The country is neither a serious player in
geo-politics nor particularly dependent on any
external power or alliance. No external force
supports internal political forces opposed to the
poor, or holds a veto over public policies
intended to support the poor. Insofar as
Bangladesh can be said to be dependent in any
immediate political sense, it is on aid donors
and international financial institutions con-
cerned about the poverty impact of public pol-
icy and spending.3
Poverty in Bangladesh is extreme and overt -
especially as it manifests itself in the very high
dependence on human muscle power for the
most basic tasks, such as transport, breaking
bricks for construction work, and lifting irriga-
tion water. Unlike in South Africa, it is difficult
for Bangladeshi elites to avoid seeing poverty by
not looking for it. Even in the elite residential
areas of Dhaka, the poor are on the streets by
day and camping out by night. Poverty in
Bangladesh would appear, from any humanitar-
ian perspective, to be a very pressing problem
for government and for the non-poor.
The big development NGOs in Bangladesh -
the Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika - are world
famous for their anti-poverty work, especially
in micro-credit and education. One might
expect this to provide a stimulus and a model
for effective public anti-poverty action more
generally
Bangladesh is a democracy, albeit an imperfect
one.
On the basis of this cursory view of history and pol-
itics, one might hope that Bangladesh would indeed
be in line for the UN award. Regrettably, our infor-
mation on how the Bangladeshi elite understand
107
poverty considerably dampens this outbreak of
optimism - but not in the worst way possible. The
picture of elite understandings of poverty that we
have constructed does not suggest heartlessness,
the denial of affinity with the poor or responsibility
for their welfare, contempt or, the kind of ignorant
fear that can so easily turn into support for author-
itarian political 'solutions' to poverty . Instead, we
find an elite group that (a) believe they have a real
concern for the poor but actually know little about
them; (b) would like to see more public action to
tackle poverty but have little faith in the capacity of
government to take effective action of any kind; (c)
do not see poverty and the poor as a significant
threat to their own lifestyle and welfare; and there-
fore (d) do not in practice see poverty as an urgent
problem for any kind of action, public or private,
and especially not for political action.
2 The Research
This article is based primarily on information from
semi-structured interviews with 95 members of the
Bangladeshi elite between November 1997 and
April 1998. Most of the interviews were conducted
by Naomi Hossain and Abul Hossain. We define
'elite' in terms of power: the capacity to influence
events and discourses. Our sample included promi-
nent members of the political, civil service and mil-
itary elites, including some retired people; editors of
English and Bangla newspapers and journals; busi-
ness leaders from a range of industries and associa-
tions; directors of large NGOs and prominent NGO
activists; social elites involved in charity work; stu-
dent leaders; and prominent Islamic figures.
Seventy-five of our respondents were based in
Dhaka,4 five in the second city of Chittagong and 15
in the provincial towns of Comilla and Rangpur. We
have mainly treated all respondents as part of a
national elite, but distinguished where appropriate
between national (Dhaka-based) and regional
(Chittagong, Comilla and Rangpur) elites. The
interview topics included the extent and nature of
poverty; allocation of responsibility, if any, for tack-
ling poverty; the effectiveness of various types of
anti-poverty interventions; the impact of poverty on
the elites and society generally; policy priorities for
Aid w Bangladesh accounted for about 10% of GNP in This includes members of parliament representing
the 1980s, but fell rapidly from 9.9% in 1990 to 6.9% non-Dhaka electorates.
in 1994 and 3.9% in 1996 (World Development Report
1996, Table 3; and World Development Indicators 1998).
government; and the international image of
Bangladesh. Respondents were encouraged to raise
issues that concerned them arid shape the agenda
for the interview. As far as possible, we have sum-
marised patterns of response in quantitative form;
this necessarily involved the exercise of judgement
in interpreting responses.
3 The Bangladeshi Elite
This article appears to assume that the Bangladeshi
elite had a homogenous set of views about the
nature, causes, consequences and remedies of
poverty That is because the answers presented to
us were similar across different categories of the
elite, which in turn reflects the fact that the
(national level) Bangladeshi elite is relatively
homogenous - an elite, rather than a collection of
distinct elites. The former Westernised, Urdu-
speaking urban-based national elite has been
replaced by a Bangla-speaking group concentrated
in Dhaka. Dhaka dominates urban life in
Bangladesh to a far greater extent than do the
metropolises of other large poor countries.5 The
top echelons of business, formerly dominated by
various minority ethnic groups, are increasingly
occupied by Bengali Muslims (Kochanek 1993:
113-15; Sobhan and Sen 1988). Members of the
elite straddle different economic and social sec-
tors, and interact a great deal. Any member is
likely to have friends, relatives, and friends of
friends and relatives who sit in parliament, own
garment firms, direct NGOs, edit newspapers,
produce TV programmes, chair state banks, com-
mand regiments, control consultancy companies,
preside over government departments and manage
aid offices. While divided at the interpersonal level
over who will be nominated for this electorate,
awarded that contract, or get that job, the
Bangladeshi elite is not divided by any great polit-
ical or social cleavage. In class terms it is united,
unified and dominant over Bangladeshi society In
answering questions about poverty, members of
the elite do not feel driven to pursue some intra-
elite conflict by proxy.
We devised an Index of Metropolitan Concentration to
measure this phenomenon: the proportion of the
combined populations of the four largest cities that lived
in the single largest city This figure was 64% for
Bangladesh (Dhaka), with its population of 120 million,
compared to 36% for South Africa (Capetown), with a
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4 Much Poverty: No Threat
The Bangladeshi elite have no illusions about the
extent of poverty: 72% of our interviewees esti-
mated that more than half of the population lived in
poverty Yet very few perceive poverty as a direct
threat to their own well-being and any concerns
expressed were nebulous:
I don't think they are worried about the poverty
issue, but I think that most elites in Bangladesh
are probably worried about the future of
Bangladesh, whether elites' lives will be affected
directly by this grinding poverty, the breakdown
of law and order, whether there will be any jobs
for their children, when they come back from
the United States after getting their MA. That
kind of thing. Is there a future for the elite? That
kind of thing [prominent NGO leader].
This contrasts with the historical experience of
European countries, where elites commonly per-
ceived poverty as a direct threat to their own secu-
rity and welfare through links to crime, disease,
social and political unrest, military weakness and
national inefficiency (Toye, this volume). In con-
temporary South Africa and Brazil (Reis and
Cheibub 1994), elites view poverty as a cause of
urban violence and crime.
Crime and immigration into cities do concern the
Bangladeshi elite, but neither rural immigrants nor
poor people generally were seen to be at the root of
the crime problem (Table 1), and our national elite
respondents, in particular, dismissed the idea of a
link between crime and poverty:
I do not connect [the law and order situation]
with poverty, because the majority of the poor
people are law-abiding - you cannot generalise
that we have many poor people so the law and
order situation is deteriorating. No, there is no
such connection [government secretary].
Organised crime is considered to be the major prob-
lem, but its perpetrators are generally identified as
total population of only 41 million; 49% for Brazil (Sao
Paulo); and 34% for India (Mumbai). Among large poor
countries, only Mexico has an Index of Metropolitan
Concentration higher than that of Bangladesh (Mexico
City, 75%) (Times Atlas of the World 1997: 64; Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics, 1997).
Table 1: Is increasing urban migration of the poor linked to the rising crime rate?
No
The poor are not the main perpetrators of crime
Yes, but crimes are not committed against the elite
Yes
No clear answer
All responses
'students', 'the drug addicts of the middle classes or
rich men's sons', or the police themselves - in sum,
not the poor. The police are believed to have little
interest in protecting the children of the elite from
assaults, or even to be somehow implicated in them.
Elite families cannot protect themselves against
organised violence or abuse of state power with the
same degree of reliability that they protect their bod-
ies, homes and offices against the ever-present poor
- by installing high walls and security systems, and
travelling everywhere by car. The fact that the less
privileged regional and student elites perceive urban
poverty as a more significant threat to their own
well-being presumably reflects their inability to
insulate themselves physically to the same degree.
This lack of an association between poverty and
crime is consistent with the fact that our respon-
dents tended to view the Bangladeshi poor as hon-
est people struggling for simple respectability In the
past, European elites often viewed anti-poverty
measures as part of a 'civilising mission' to the
uncultured and untamed poor (Beier 1983;
Himmelfarb 1991). In Bangladesh the elite talk in
diametrically opposed terms: it is the poor and not
the elite who are the repository of moral values.
Although religious leaders were inclined to refer to
a general moral decline, most respondents viewed
the poor as more moral and less greedy than other
people, and content with their simple lives:
Families in rural areas never think in terms of a
motor car, a refrigerator, air conditioner and so
on ... In Dhaka you drive, you have got all the
tensions, you have got a lakh of taka in your
hand; you go for another Iakh, and another - it's
like a craze is going on. But that fellow, the meal
for the next one or two days - he doesn't bother
about the rest of it; I think they are quite satis-
fied [former government secretaryl.
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28 (43%)
6(9%)
2(3%)
17 (26%)
12 (18%)
65 (100%)
As one prominent newspaper editor put it: 'one
does not really fear the poor people - poverty cre-
ates a sense of diffidence or dependence'. Diffidence
and dependence combine with an inherent honest
simplicity to provide an understanding of the poor
- particularly the rural poor - as both absolutely
and relatively unthreatening.
The Bangladeshi elite seemed similarly uncon-
cerned about the public health threats from poverty
and urban overcrowding which have so concerned
other urban elites (Gooptu 1997; de Swaan 1988).
In Bangladesh, forced evictions of bus tee (slum) ten-
ants appear to stem from conflicts over land, not
from public health concerns (Khan 1998; Islam et
al. 1997). The Bangladeshi elite do not link poverty
with threats to their own health, perhaps because
they have access to high quality private health care.
They may be over-optimistic: research on poverty
and health in other contemporary contexts suggests
that the diseases of poverty continue to impact on
the non-poor (Lipson 1998, Skold 1998, Stephens
1996, Wallace and Wallace 1997, WHO 1996).
Another threat prominent in the minds of 19th-cen-
tury European elites was that of social and political
unrest. Concerns that poverty might lead to social
unrest rarely emerged during our interviews, and
then only in the vaguest terms. One businessman
claimed, typically, that revolution was 'not possible
in the current world context'. One reason for the
weakness of this concern seems to be the elite's
sense of international mobility Members have
options to exit from Bangladesh: entry visas to the
US and the UK, overseas bank accounts etc.
Options are not preferences. Social status and
wealth are in most cases dependent on living in
Bangladesh. But the existence of the exit option
contributes to psychological insulation from the
worst consequences of poverty
Responses Number of responses
A second reason for this lack of concern about
social unrest is that the current pattern of political
conflict in Bangladesh effectively demobilises the
poor and provides no grounds for the rich to fear
that poverty will become politicised. The experi-
ences of the war of Independence, and the contin-
ued presence among the present political leadership
of members of families who played a leading role in
that struggle, provide the current state and consti-
tution with considerable legitimacy Governments
have been chosen democratically for some years.
The alternating ruling parties, the Awami League
and the Bangladesh National Party, are near-identi-
cal in composition, support and policies.6 Both have
become dominated by businessmen and business
financing (Khan et al. 1996). The rural population
still suffers from widespread illiteracy and poor
communications. Dhaka dominates the national
political agenda. Unlike in, for example, India or Sri
Lanka, rurality and a sense of rural deprivation have
not become political issues in opposition to urban
populations and interests.
The Bangladeshi elite can construct the poor as
harmless and morally superior to the elite because
the poor have no real political power. Richpoor
relations are viewed as relatively conflict-free. The
potential for tension between rich and poor, some
of the elite believe, is defused to an extent by the
appearance of elite concern about the conditions of
the poor, particularly through highly visible NGO
and private charitable activities. As one former gov-
ernment member stated, 'I don't worry about it,
because I believe that we are not terribly insensitive
by and large I think we do care'.
Finally, there is absolutely no echo within the
Bangladeshi elite of the kinds of concerns about the
threat from poverty to national military strength
that motivated so many public welfare initiatives in
Britain from the late nineteenth century (especially
during the Boer War). Our military respondents felt
that they have a large enough pool of healthy
recruits to draw on for the armed forces. The
Bangladeshi government and elite are not preoccu-
pied by potential military competition. If they were,
they would focus much more on establishing and
financing technologically complex air attack and
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defence systems than on recruiting millions of fit
young men into the armed forces.
5 Nebulous Poverty:
Undifferentiated Poor
The weakness of any perceived threat to their own
well-being because of the prevalence of poverty
means that the Bangladeshi elite's attention is not
drawn to the issue of poverty as a priority However
concerned members believe themselves to be about
poverty, they do not view it as urgent, or as a prob-
lem distinct from the more generic problem of
national poverty and underdevelopment. Poverty
tends to be viewed as a label for these pervasive
national conditions and problems. Most problems
of society, economy, ecology and polity in
Bangladesh can be and are talked about as poverty
problems. Table 2 illustrates that issues which the
elite consider to be national priorities for govern-
ment to tackle are very similar to those which they
consider to be causes of poverty
The fact that the national policy priorities identified
by the elite so closely parallel the causal explana-
tions they give for poverty might imply that poverty
is the issue of overriding importance. Alternatively,
it may be that discussions of poverty are by default
discussions of national problems. The practical
implications are ambiguous. On the one hand, this
implicit identification of poverty with national
underdevelopment could, in principle, be used as a
catalyst to a broader national development effort, as
it was in the early decades of communist rule in
China. On the other hand, where 'poverty' is con-
ceptually assimilated into a standard repertoire of
national development issues and lacks political pri-
ority, it becomes difficult to treat poverty as an issue
in itself. That appears to be the situation in
Bangladesh at present. Questions about 'poverty'
easily slide into a nebulous discussion about
national problems and priorities, in which the poor
may feature only tangentially and indirectly
This lack of an urgent concern with or clear focus
on poverty seems closely related to the fact that
most of our respondents were both unable and
unwilling to make distinctions between different
An analysis of their budgetary programmes revealed development priorities even at a more detailed level'
that 'the two major parties are not only committed to the (Centre for Policy Dialogue 1997: 100).
same economic philosophy, but also share similar
Table 2: Elite perceptions of national priorities and the causes of poverty
categories of poor people, even for the hypothetical
purposes of targeting anti-poverty activities. They
tended to present the poor as an undifferentiated
mass, and justified this partly on moral grounds:
that it was not right to make what might be read as
moral distinctions among a class of people who
were generally viewed as inherently worthy This is
a great contrast to other situations, where moral dis-
tinctions - e.g. between the 'deserving' and the
'undeserving' poor - have helped mobilise support
for anti-poverty measures, as well as punitive social
reform (Squires 1990). Any distinctions made were
usually on grounds of gender, and clearly intended
as non-judgmental. Professional beggars were not
generally seen as 'genuinely' poor, as they were
believed to have a good income from begging. This
reluctance to make distinctions within the poor
accords with a high implicit value placed on the
image of national ethnic and linguistic homogene-
ity The existence of disadvantaged minority ethnic
groups, such as the Biharis and adivasis (tribals), for
example, was consistently underplayed by an insis-
tence on national cultural uniformity
Both the generalised quality of discussions of
poverty and the stress on the homogeneity of the
poor - and of Bangladeshi society as a whole - may
reflect the elite's limited contact with and experi-
ence of the poor. The language and concepts of
poverty that they employ imply an undefined,
remote 'social movement' against poverty, rather
than pressure for direct, targeted and measurable
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efforts by government. While South African elites
tend to reduce the problem of poverty to an issue of
race, the Bangladeshi elite extend the problem of
poverty to encompass other national priorities.
6 Diffuse Solutions
Given that elite conceptions of the causes of poverty
overlapped with their conceptions of national socio-
economic priorities, it is no surprise that the solu-
tions offered for poverty were often 'developmental'
in nature, not involving a direct attack on poverty
per se. Business leaders and civil bureaucrats were
relatively optimistic that the 'trickle-down' mecha-
nism would come into operation, i.e. that economic
growth would itself make a major contribution to
alleviating poverty The more widespread view was
that economic growth is necessary but not sufficient,
and that the crucial path for poverty reduction is
human resource development. Almost no support
could be found for publicly funded safety nets for
the poor, partly on grounds of cost, but mostly, it
seemed, because the elite felt that this kind of social
protection would not enhance productivity, and
could not be seen as the responsibility of the state.
This relates to the tendency of the elite to view direct
assistance to individuals in need as the responsibil-
ity of other individuals or 'society', not of the state
(see section 8). Those closest to 'official' government
and donor discourses of poverty were better
informed about direct poverty alleviation interven-
tions such as public works, micro-enterprise and
Aggregated categories of responses National priorities
(number of times
the response was
given)
Causes of poverty
(number of times
the response was
given)
Motivational factors among the poor themselves
(awareness, religious orthodoxy fatalism)
7 (4%) 16 (9%)
Educationlskills/human resources 39 (22%) 34 (19%)
Political factors 22 (13%) 23 (13%)
Economic management 42 (24%) 47 (26%)
Structural inequalities in access to resources 30 (17%) 24 (13%)
Overpopulation and pressure on the land 14 (8%) 22 (12%)
Natural disasters, land erosion 3(2%) 6(3%)
Women rights 2(1%) 0(0%)
Law and order 17 (10%) 0(0%)
Donor dependence, colonialism 0(0%) 10 (6%)
Total (100%) (100%)
feeding programmes, but in general, questions about
solutions to poverty elicited very similar responses
from all sections of the elite.
One belief that emerged clearly was that the poor
should be helped, but helped to help themselves.
Despite the wide range of factors identified as causes
of poverty (see Table 2), education was the single
most popular means of tackling poverty directly
Education served as a catch-all concept: intellectuals
interpreted it in terms of improving political partic-
ipation or empowerment, while business leaders
viewed it as a means of improving practical skills.
However, there was considerable agreement that
education would make the poor 'conscious', and
that this in turn would impact positively on their
behaviour. The priority was universal primary edu-
cation, which was felt to be achievable, given the
recent increases in enrolment rates.
The Bangladeshi elite, highly educated themselves,
undoubtedly value education. But claiming educa-
tion to be the best solution to povertyeffectively
diverts attention away from inequality, and onto less
political issues, like the mentality of the poor.
Implicitly, if education is the best solution to
poverty, the causes of poverty - although not the
fault of the poor - must be inherent within the
poor, rather than in socioeconomic relations or pat-
terns of inequality Interpretations of developmental
success elsewhere also shape perceptions of what
constitutes desirable poverty alleviation. Reference
was frequently made to Asian success stories as
models for Bangladesh, including Kerala and Sri
Lanka as well as the 'Asian Tigers'. It is not clear that
these successes have been analysed closely as the
lessons drawn were restricted to the contribution of
education. Asset redistribution and state-sponsored
social security were not options which the
Bangladeshi elite has seriously considered.
We were struck by this virtual consensus that edu-
cation is the solution to poverty, and probed for the
exact mechanisms through which education might
be expected to have this effect. There was strong
agreement that the poor were generally 'unaware' or
'unconscious', and that this was an important deter-
minant of their behaviour. The most concrete
responses included the suggestions that education
would enable the poor 'to take advantage of the
opportunities available to them'; to plan for the
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future and their families; and to learn income-gen-
erating skills. Many interviewees argued for a prag-
matic focus on the next generation, accepting that
this would not help those currently destitute.
Although landlessness and lack of access to
resources were identified as causes of poverty (Table
2), the priority accorded to education as the funda-
mental solution implies a belief that redistribution
of resources would not in itself be an effective rem-
edy This interpretation derives from our interviews,
not from abstract logic: our respondents repeatedly
suggested that the poor currently do not have the
mental resources to make use of any material
resources directed their way
7 Limited Faith in the State
When asked about the record and performance of
state agencies in anti-poverty programmes, many of
our respondents cited specific cases, notably in edu-
cation, fertility control, and the activities of the Local
Government Engineering Department. But the over-
all image of state performance was poor: only a fifth
of respondents believed that government is in prac-
tice effective at reducing poverty (Table 3).
There were, however, significant differences among
sections of the elite in both their knowledge and
their evaluation of public action. With few excep-
tions, those not directly involved in anti-poverty
programmes were poorly informed, and had even
less information about successes. Many respon-
dents described such programmes as 'an eyewash',
and the outcome of governments leaping on suc-
cessive donor-driven bandwagons: 'These are all
just fads, first poverty alleviation, then environ-
ment, then violence against women' (Jatiya Party
MP). 'State elites' - i.e. politicians, public servants
and military officers - had greater faith in the actual
and potential for effective state anti-poverty action
than other elites (Table 3). Public servants, in par-
ticular, displayed more detailed knowledge of exist-
ing programmes and policy
Table 4 provides an even clearer indication of weak
faith in the capacity of the Bangladeshi state. If the
state were to play a role in poverty alleviation, it
would have to raise more financial resources.
Because aid inflows are fast declining, this implies
additional taxation. The performance of
Bangladeshi governments in raising revenue
Table 3: Is government effective at reducing poverty?
through taxation is dismal, even allowing for the
overall poverty of the nation.7 Our elite respondents
recognised this in responding to our question about
their willingness to pay for more and better poverty
alleviation programmes through additional taxa-
tion. Half of them felt unable to answer, on the
grounds that it was simply unrealistic to assume
that government could actually collect more rev-
enue or use it for any specified purpose.
8 Action Outside the State
The relative invisibility of state anti-poverty pro-
grammes contrasts with the detailed information
displayed about the activities of development
NGOs. Many NGOs received warm praise for their
perceived successes and Grameen Bank, in particu-
lar, was credited with having improved the interna-
tional image of Bangladesh. Some concerns were
raised, usually that NGOs were 'becoming more like
businesses', and not functioning as private volun-
tary or charitable organisations. That in turn raises
It is an indication of the poor management of public
finances in Bangladesh that the most recent - and then
only provisional - figures on government revenue that
are sufficiently reliable ro be included in the IMF'S
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a question about norms relating to responsibility for
anti-poverty measures that we can only touch on
here. Many respondents alluded to ideas of personal
religious, moral and social responsibility for assist-
ing the poor that have strong roots in elite Bengali
Muslim culture. But it is not clear how far this per-
sonal responsibility would be discharged by sup-
porting development NGOs, which are after all
large, bureaucratic, relatively impersonal and in
many respects like state agencies. The character and
scale of the large NGOs means they straddle simple
publicprivate conceptual boundaries. In the same
way, 'public' officials - politicians, civil servants and
so on - often conceptualise their responsibilities to
poor citizens in personalised and charitable terms.
What does emerge clearly is that Bangladeshi elites
not only have limited faith in the capacity of the state
to tackle poverty, but they believe, in a normative
sense, that poverty is not the responsibility of the
state alone. Minorities among our respondents have
been classified as believing that tackling poverty is (a)
International Financial Statistics Yearbook refer to 1985. At
that point, government revenue accounted for 10% of
GNP - little more than half of the typical figure for
countries at similar income levels (IMF 1997).
No 9 (36%) 23 (53%) 32 (47%)
Ambivalent 1 (4%) 4(9%) 5(7%)
Less effective than NGOs 0(0%) 3(7%) 3(4%)
Potentially 8 (32%) 8 (19%) 16 (24%)
Yes 7 (28%) 5 (12%) 12 (18%)
All responses 25 (100%) 43 (100%) 68 (100%)
Response Number of responses
No 15 (25%)
Ambivalent 5(8%)
Collection is the problem 28 (47%)
Yes 12 (20%)
All responses 60 (100%)
Responses State elites Other elites All responses
(politicians, public
servants, military
officers)
Table 4: Would you support increasing taxation for more and better poverty alleviation
programmes?
Table 5: Who is ultimately responsible for poverty alleviation?
solely the state's responsibility or (b) not the business
of the state at all (Table 5). These are gross classifica-
tions of what are often quite nuanced views. For
example, one business leader argued:
In fact it is not whether [the governmentl should
engage in anti-poverty work, their entire mis-
sion should be to combat poverty, but there is a
difference. Government should go in for attack-
ing poverty - a good government should do it
on a macro-level, by putting an enabling envi-
ronment in place which attacks poverty But one
doesn't expect the government to go in and do
the fieldwork, direct anti-poverty work - that
should be left to the NGOs or the private sector
or the charities or whatever.
That conception of the relative roles of government
and NGOs is broadly typical of most of our respon-
dents, who believe that responsibility for alleviating
poverty should be shared between the state and var-
ious non-state actors (Table 5). There were few clear
differences among sections of the elite in this
respect. Only the regional elites - i.e. people living
in the smaller towns rather than in Dhaka - stand
out as having little faith in the state acting alone.
This presumably reflects their relative distance from
state power and corresponding reluctance to sanc-
tion any purely 'statist' project.
9 Conclusions: Potential for
Action?
Why is Bangladesh unlikely to win the UN
'National Poverty Commitment Award' in 2000,
despite the supportive conditions listed in section
1? We have given several answers here. The elite do
not see the poor as a threat or poverty as an urgent
problem. In class terms they are united and domi-
nant over their society No significant section of the
elite is driven to mobilise the poor around concerns
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about poverty in pursuit of some intra-elite conflict.
The anti-poverty agenda is not pressing, and is eas-
ily assimilated into a national development agenda.
Insofar as poverty is understood to have a specific
solution, that lies in education, and therefore in the
long term. And the Bangladeshi state is not believed
to be effective.
But the long-term situation is not necessarily so
bleak. Bangladesh might just be a serious competi-
tor for the National Poverty Commitment Award in
2005 or 2010. Our reasons for thinking so? Some,
of a long-term nature, are given in section 1. We
demonstrated in later sections that the Bangladeshi
elite do have a relatively benign attitude and sense
of responsibility towards the poor. They do not dis-
play that sense of fear or contempt that can lead to
punitive and authoritarian measures to exclude the
poor from politics or from the public spaces that the
elites wish to enjoy. They see in their development
NGOs a mechanism through which poverty can be
tackled effectively. Their views about the causes of
and solutions to poverty are relatively consensual:
there is little radical disagreement. There is some
material - cultural, ideological, institutional and
practical -. which could be used to ignite, if not a
raging conflagration against poverty, then at least a
steady flame. What will it take to set the flame
alight? Perversely, in the light of the title of this bul-
letin, the answer may lie not in any discovery of a
distinctive set of Bengali Muslim elite conceptions
of poverty, butin the high degree of implied con-
vergence about the potential solutions to poverty
between (a) our elite respondents and (b) much of
the conventional wisdom of the international devel-
opment community Let us look first at this conver-
gence.
The views of the Bangladeshi elite on poverty are
influenced by the 'aid business'. The country was
until recently heavily aid-dependent. Many of
Responses National elites Regional elites State elites Non-state elites All elites
Government alone 20 38% 0 0% 7 35% 13 30% 20 31%
Government, NGOs,
individuals, society
23 43% 10 91% 11 55% 22 50% 33 52%
NGOs, individuals, society 10 19% 1 9% 2 10% 9 20% 11 17%
All responses 53 100% 11 100% 20 100% 44 100% 64 100%
Bangladesh's aid donors have focused on poverty
The influence of aid is most immediately evident in
the terms that many of our respondents used to talk
of poverty Aid-speak terms - 'enabling environ-
ment', 'two-pronged attack on poverty', 'human
resource development', 'intra-household distribu-
tion' - cropped up frequently and unbidden. The
influence of the aid business may extend beyond the
purely verbal to shape elite perceptions of poverty in
a more profound sense. We cannot prove this in any
strict sense. We were, however, struck by the high
degree of overlap between our respondents' pre-
ferred anti-poverty strategies and the so-called 'new
poverty agenda' - the World Bank-based 'orthodoxy'
articulated in the 1990 World Development Report on
Poverty (Lipton et al., 1992). The major elements
common to the two 'strategies' are: emphasis on
human resource development and alleviating
poverty by making the poor more productive;
implicit agreement on giving priority to economic
growth, but with a bias toward the poor ('pro-poor
growth' in aid-speak); scepticism aborit asset redis-
tribution, state action and direct transfer of
resources to the poor; a favourable view of NGO and
non-state initiatives generally; and a willingness to
recognise that poverty might have a gender dimen-
sion. The only component of the 'new poverty
agenda' rejected by our respondents is 'safety nets',
i.e. publicly funded programmes to transfer
resources to the most vulnerable as a last resort,
where othermeans of supporting them fail.
It is not really important to our story how far the
views of the Bangladeshi elite on solutions to
poverty are shaped by contact with the interna-
tional aid community or merely convergent with
them. For that convergence provides intellectual,
moral and practical leverage to Bangladeshi politi-
cians and social activists, who might feel inspired to
construct a more pressing 'anti-poverty agenda' for
Bangladesh than the one that currently exists. Local
elite and international views converge particularly
strongly over the priority to be given to education,
especially to primary education, with a window
open to the importance of girls' education. A num-
ber of other factors provide the basis for a relatively
united front between the Bangladeshi state, the
elite, the NGOs and aid donors to tackle poverty
through an emphasis on (female, primary) educa-
tion. They include: high economic returns to pri-
mary education in poor countries (Psacharopolous
115
1994; World Bank 1995); the contribution to
reduced fertility of female education (World Bank
1995); the rapid growth of female employment in
the Bangladeshi garment industry, which can be
used to argue for female education on grounds of
national economic efficiency; and the fact that
BRAC and other NGOs have demonstrated that
highly cost-effective elementary (non-formal) edu-
cation programmes can be run on a massive scale
(Jam 1996).
One important potential role for concerned politi-
cians and social activists is ideological entrepre-
neurship: constructing and disseminating
arguments about the urgency of anti-poverty inter-
ventions that will command wide support and lead
to interventions that are financially and organisa-
tionally feasible. The aid donors and the NGOs
need little convincing about the potential value of
(female) primary education. This needs first to be
presented to the elites, in convincing local idioms
linking the success of the project to the welfare of
elites, whether in terms of international prestige, a
more reliable workforce, or some other terms.
Second, the same kind of ideological creativity
needs to be employed to try to ensure that getting
more poor girls into school is only the thin end of
the wedge. What is the use of these efforts to get
girls into school if they are too malnourished to
study well? Something needs to be done about their
diet. But they are also missing too much school
because of illness. Then, are they getting the very
best out of school when they go home to illiterate
mothers? We will put a stop to the speculation here
by pointing out that it is speculation, not fantasy
For example, substantial elements of a 'welfare state'
for mothers and children were created in the United
States in the nineteenth century on the basis of sim-
ilar arguments about the centrality of healthy, edu-
cated youngsters to the future of the nation, and the
importance of looking after the health and income
of mothers as a means of providing for youth
(Skocpol 1992). These may not be quite the right
arguments for Bangladesh today And it is not
enough simply to translate them into Bangla. But
there are arguments already floating around Dhaka
that, appropriately shaped, refined and welded
together, could become powerful levers on behalf of
the poor by encouraging the elite to see active anti-
poverty measures as more urgent and more in their
own long-term interests.
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